When An American Diplomat Stood Up Against Nixon-Kissinger To Save Dhaka

December, 1971 

The Pakistan Air Force bombed Indian airfields, and then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi declared war against the enemy. The breakout of armed hostilities was not due to a sudden escalation but a result of a brutal crackdown by Pakistani troops on its citizens in the east (now Bangladesh). 

‘Operation Searchlight’ as it was called, resulted in a systematic annihilation of Bengalis and other minorities in east Pakistan and death count surpassing 3 million and over 4,00,000 women were subjected to sexual assault. It was genocide the US intentionally ignored.

Tensions In South Asia

The 1965 war marked a crucial shift in Indian politics, then Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri died under mysterious circumstances during the Tashkent Agreement in 1966 and Indira Gandhi was elected as the Prime Minister of India. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s Field Marshal Ayub Khan handed over the reins to General Yahya Khan who declared martial law across the country after his anointment. A year later in 1970, Yahya Khan declared general elections to legitimise his position and “bring democracy” back into Pakistan.

To his and everyone’s surprise, Sheikh Mujibur Rehman’s Awami League in East Pakistan won a majority in the 311-member National Assembly. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was not ready to accept the decision, especially seeing a Bengali rule the Pathans and Mohajirs in West Pakistan. The fire was ignited in the east and the revolution led to a crackdown. Major General Tikka Khan, also known as the Butcher of East Pakistan, ordered an armed suppression of a freedom movement.

‘Dissent Cables’

Archer Blood was a young American diplomat posted at the consulate office in Dacca. His telegrams to the White House are considered to be one of the most strongly worded opinions against the American policy toward Pakistan and their decision to ignore the crackdown in the east outrightly. 

On April 6, 1971, in one of the now-declassified telegrams, he wrote, “I am aware of the task force proposals on “openness” in the foreign service and with the conviction that the US policy related to recent development in east Pakistan serves neither our moral interests broadly defined nor our national interests narrowly defined…Our government has failed to denounce atrocities. Our government has failed to take forceful measures to protect its citizens while the same time bending over backwards to placate west Pak dominated government and to lessen likely and deservedly negative international public relations impact against them.

“Our government has evidence what many will consider moral bankruptcy,” the cable authorized by Blood and signed by 20 others said. 

Then-US President Richard Nixon and his foreign minister Henry Kissinger did not view India as an ally. They had an inherent emotional dislike towards New Delhi, which was later proven when the US sent the USS Enterprise into the Indian Ocean to threaten the Indian Navy in the east and support the authoritarian Pakistani regime. The ‘Dissent Cable’ highlights the American hypocrisy and says, “Ironically, at a time when USSR sent President Yahya Khan a message defending democracy, condemning arrest of leader of democratically elected majority party and calling for repressive measures and bloodshed…We have chosen not to intervene, even morally on the grounds that the Awami conflict, in which unfortunately the overworked term genocide is applicable, is purely an internal matter of a sovereign state….”

American journalist Gary J Bass has written the most detailed account in his book – ‘The Blood Telegram Nixon, Kissinger, And A Forgotten Genocide’, and explains how the American diplomat shared first-hand information to Washington of the atrocities Pakistani troops are committing, especially using American weapons like the Chaffee tanks and the F-86 Sabre jets against its citizens, but the Oval office chose to ignore the gravity of the situation.

The war ended in just 14 days. Over 3,800 Indian Armed Forces personnel were killed in action and over 9,800 were wounded. At least 90,000 Pakistani soldiers in the east surrendered. Bangladesh was born out of the sacrifice of Indian soldiers and the Mukti Bahini.

Read more: Explained: Key Events That Forced 93,000 Pakistani Troops To Surrender In 1971

Yahya Khan Gets US Backing

US President Richard Nixon and his foreign minister Henry Kissinger were determined to establish relations with China, for which the duo needed Pakistan, and Islamabad was bought using military and financial aid. 

The American objective was to create a new front against the USSR in South Asia, especially after the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s. The crisis in East Pakistan came at just the right time for the US to show its support to Yahya Khan to bargain a better position in talks with China. Richard Nixon travelled to China the following year in 1972 after Kissinger’s back-channel diplomacy with Beijing for some time. The visit came at the cost of a genocide in the east that the US failed to stop. Richard Nixon even snapped at the height of the crisis in east Pakistan and said, “I don’t like the Indians,” a dislike stemming from India’s nonaligned movement and the historically good relations with the Soviet Union since independence.

A memorandum sent by Kissinger to Nixon, titled ‘Policy Options Toward Pakistan‘, on April 28, almost three weeks after the dissent cable, was declassified by the US. The document states how Kissinger gave three policy options towards Pakistan to President Nixon and suggested that it would be in the best “interests to have the advantage of making the most of the relationship with Yahya while engaging in a serious effort to move the situation toward conditions less damaging to US and Pakistani interests.”

“We would not withhold aid now for the sake of applying pressure We would face that question only after giving the West Pakistanis every chance to negotiate a settlement in the face of the costs of not doing so,” he said in the memorandum. 

“On economic assistance, we would state our willingness to help in the context of a West Pakistani effort to negotiate a viable settlement We would have to point out that it will be beyond the US–or World Bank or IMF- -financial capacity to help Pakistan if the situation drags on and Pakistan faces a financial crisis We would also have to point out that US assistance legislation requires that economic aid be reduced to the extent that there is a possibility of its diversion to military purposes.” 

Sensing US backing for Yahya, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi signed the Indo-Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation in August 1971, setting the agenda that in case of aggression against any of the two parties, then they would immediately consult each other. It irked the Americans, but for New Delhi, it served the purpose of nonalignment and national interests.

The dissent cable advised the White House to rethink its policy toward Pakistan and said, “I hope the most likely eventual outcome of the struggle underway in east Pakistan and the consequent establishment of an independent Bangladesh. At the moment, we possess the goodwill of the Awami League. We would be foolish to forfeit this asset by pursuing a rigid policy of one-sided support to the likely loser.”